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Abstract
In large social systems agents are characterized as elements in a topological
attribute space. Usually there exists a complete relational structure between
these agents. If, however, this relational pattern is restricted, there emerge nat-
ural organizational structures between agents. We focus our attention to one
such a structure, called a network. It turns out that these networks usually exist
in a deterministic graph-theoretic setting. Networks can be interpreted as po-
tential or latent organizations, one of which will eventually emerge as a eocial
organization.
This paper is concerned with the question whether in large economies with
a restticted relational pattern there exist such potential organizational struc-
tures. We state and prove some existence results for a substantial class of these
economies, called network ecouomies.
We conclude this paper by defining a core concept for a lazge network econ-
omy. We show that this core is equal to the core of the large economy underlying
the network economy. Since the communication requirements of the first core
concept are less stringent, the network econorny is a more efficient concept when-
ever communication efforts are taken into account.
1 Introduction
The organization oí economic decisions in a society is a fundamental problem in eco-
nomic theory. A society is modelled as a large social system, in which agents are
characteriaed as elements in a topological attribute space, and in which an allocation
mechanism is defined. The best known example in economic theory is the market
economy, designed by Walras in 1874, and given its definitive formulation by Arrow
and Debreu (1954). These so called general equilibrium models of a market economy
have, however, a poor social structure. It is, e.g., assumed that no interaction between
agents exists, and that agents are only related to a fictitious agent, called the market.
Furthermore, the only social norm involved is to maximize individual utility or profit
given the market prices.
The functioning of any economic system, however, depends crucially on the
interactions between individual agents and on the social norms and values involved.
Those values and norms determine each agent's behaviour in a society, and may depend
on the position an agent occupies in the society. In this paper we introduce these2
positions by means of a graph on the set of agents. The relations between agenta in this
paper are, however, not specified in terms of values, norms or trade flows, but represent
any sort of communication between agents. The only specification in communication
that is made is the distinction between direct and indirect communication. In the
second part of this paper we will interprete these communication relations as trade
relations.
We assume that, whenever some restrictions are exogeneously put on the direct
communication between agents, agents will try to circumvent these reatrictions by
setting up organizational structures to restore full communication in order to attain
the desired, yet unspecified goals.
Agents can establish many of such indirect communication links. We call auch a
structure of agents a network, if it satisfies the requirements of full scope and connec-
tivity. Full scope means that every agent can communicate indirectly with every other
agent in the economy by means of the connected network. A network is minimal, if no
agent can be deleted without harming these two conditions. The main theorem gives
sufficient conditions on the attribute space for existence of a minimal network.
The strength of such a network economy will be illustrated by showing that net-
works can compensate fully for certain restrictions on communication. We introduce a
large exchange economy with the usual assumption ofcomplete and free communication
between agents forming coalitions. Communication may be interpreted as establishing
tra,de flows between agents. In the corresponding large network economy, communi-
cation is restricted, e.g., because it is costly. Using a theorem by Grodal (1972), we
show that the core of this network economy is equal to the core of the corresponding
economy with complete communication. Since we may assume that the information
cost in a network economy is much lower than in an economy with complete communi-
cation, and since the outcome under coalition formation is equal, the network economy
is shown to be superior to the economy with complete communication. This result will
be even more striking when applied on an economy where optimality conditions require
more exchange of information, such as in case of externalities and of public goods.
The idea of introducing an asymmetry between agents in a game by means of a graph3
goes back to Aumann and Drèze (1974) and notably Myerson (1977). In Gilles and
Ruys (1990), this asymmetry is related to the agent's attributes as expressed in a
topological space, but not necessarily derived from it. The resulting communication
pattern is assumed to be given and deterministic. The idea to be developed further
is that only one network from the large set of potential and feasible networks in an
economy, may prove fit to perform as an established or social network. Which one from
the set of contestible networks will emerge as a social organization, may be analyzed
by means of evolutionary game theory. In this case, it is not the individual agent who
is determining the final communication pattem, but the determination is based on the
interaction of individual decisions. This approach is in line with the micro-to-macro
transition, as proposed by Coleman (1990).
Another approach is to consider the choice of an agent with whom to commu-
nicate, the communication pattern, to be stochastic. This approach is followed by
Kirman (1983), Haller (1990 and 1992), Ioannides (1990), and Vriend (1991).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the social
environment is introduced. Section 3 develops the notions of a network and a network
economy. The core equivalence between a large exchange economy and a corresponding
network economy is given in section 4.
2 Abstract social environments
In the literature on general economic equilibrium theory one uses the concept of a social
system or aóstract economy to indicate a mathematical system that has the principal
features of an exchange economy.' Essentially an abstract economy consists of a set of
agents and a mapping that assigns to every agent some tuple of individual economic
attributes. Usually one takes a topological attribute space. We thus conclude that in
most cases an abstract economy is equivalent to a subspace of a topological attribute
1For this application of thia notion of a mathematical aystem we refer to, e.g., Debreu (1959),
Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975a and 19756), and Vind (1983). In most of theae contributions one usea
abstract economies to deacribe the principles of the exiatence of a competitive Walraeiaa equilibrium
in a market system.4
space. An element in this subspace is a specification of the attributes that characterize
agents. Such a specification represents a type of agents. Usually many agents may
belong to the same type, but in this paper we assume that types are identical to
agents.
In the sequel we will use the equivalence between an abatract economy and a
topological attribute space to introduce a social system as a topological space endowed
with some binary (communication) relation. Such a social system extenda the abstract
economy in two directions. Firstly, communication restrictions between agents are ex-
plicitly described. This is done through the introduction of the binary communication
relation on the collection of agents or types. Secondly, we allow for an explicit inter-
dependency of the topological structure and the communication pattern. It is namely
assumed that the topology can be generated by a neighbourtiood system consisting of
sets of relationally linked types only.
We devclop the notion of such a social system in several stages. The first stage is
the introduction of a type space, reptesenting a collection of economic agents by means
of their description with certain individual attributes. We restrict this type space by
the requirement that its topologically connected components are at most countable.
Usually this number is very small, in order to obtain a comprehensible representation
of a type. In most general equilibrium models there is only one such component, viz.
a Cartesian product of the commodity space.
Definition 2.1 A type space is n pair (A, r), where A is a collection of types and
r C 2A is a topology on A such that there exist at most countably many mazimally
topologically connected components ín (A,r).
Let a, b E A be two abstract types in the type space (A, r). The fact that there
exists a neighbourhood U E r of a with 6 E U, is now regarded as a representation
of a generalized notion of distance between the types a and b. (See also Kopperman
(1988).) llsually one would require that (A, r) is a metrizable space. As an example
of a compact metrizable type space we mention the classical economic attribute space
Rf x P, where the P-dimensional Euclidean subspace R} represents the commodity
space and ~ is the space of continuous preference relations on Rt endowed with the5
topology of closed convergence.~ A type is now a tuple (w, N), where w E Rt is an
initial commodity endowment and NE ~ is a preference relation over the commodity
space R~.
As a consequence of this definition we may introduce for every type space (A, r)
a subdivision of A as a collection
A:-{A„~nEN},
of maximally connected components in (A, r). This collection is at most countable. In
the sequel we denote for every type a E A by A(a) E A the unique component of A such
that a E A(a). The components of the subdivision A of (A, r) may be interpreted as
socia! classes in the following sense. Types within a social class vary gradually, while
types between social classcs vary discontinuously.
Note that the subdivision is fully determined by the chosen topology. One
may consider the world population and choose the distance over land as measure of
distance between agents. Then the subdivision of the world population in social classes
consists of sets of people living on the same continent. It is also clear that a trivial
division consisting of one social class is admitted, in which case the world coneists of
one continent. Although a specificatiou of these concepts should give a clue to the
causes of specific ruptures in a chosen topology, only a dynamic theory can explain
why certain ruptures creating social classes evolve.
Definition 2.2 Let (A,r) be a type space. A óinary relation R C A x A is a com-
munication pattern on (A, r) if it satisfies the following properties:
(~)
(~~)
R is symmetric and refiexive.
(A, R) is finitely connected, i.e., for all a, b E A there exists a fenite sequence
cl, ...,ck E A such that cr - a, ck - b, and (c;, c;tr ) E R for every 1 G i C
k - 1.
(iii) For every type a E A there exists an open neighbourhood U, E r with
~For a detailed analysis of this apace we refer to Hildenbrand (1974) and Grodal (1974).6
aEU,CR(a):-{6EA~(a,6)ER}.
A communication pattern describes the direct economic relationshipa between economic
agents represented by their type. It ia clear that these relationa are non-hierarchical
(Condition (i)), the economy as a whole forms a communicative unit (Condition (ii)),
and finally agents of similar type are able to wmmunicate with each other (Condition
(iii)). This last condition explicitly links similar types with each other although in the
classical economic attribute space it is least expected that similar types may achieve a
profitable tradc.
As a consequence of the adoption of a communication pattern R on a type space
(A, r) we may introduce a condensation of that pattern to the class structure of A.
Deftnition 2.3 Let (A, r) be a type space and let R C A x A be a communication
pattern on (A,r). Let P 6e given by
P:- {(A,,, Am) E A x A ~ 3a E A,,, 36 E A,,, such that (a, b) E R}.
Then the pair (A,P) is called the class structure of (A, r,R).
The elements in the subdivision A are interpreted as social classes. In that aense
the condensed relations in P represent the interclass communication pattern. Our
framework is completed by the introduction of a finite acope property on the class
structure (A, P) of R on (A, r).
DeRnition 2.4 A triple (A, r, R) is a social environment if (A, r) is a type space
and R C A x A is a communication pattern on (A, r) such that the triple (A, r, R)
satisfies the finite scope property: For every class A„ E A
~P(A,.)~ c ~~
where
P(A„) :- {Am E A ~(A,,,Am) E P}.7
A social environment is a type space endowed with a communication pattern auch
that the clasa structure represents "sparse" communication possibilitiea between the
different classes in the economy.3 It may be clear that this asaumption of finite scope
simplifies our analysis considerably. In Gilles and Ruya (1990) we have ahown that the
connectivity condition of a communication pattern implies the finite connectedneas of
the class structure of the social environment. In that case the economy as a whole
forms a communicative unit.
Lemma 2.5 (Gillea-Ruys ( 1990))
Let (A, r, R) 6e a social envimnment. Then its class structure (A, P) is a finitely
connected gmph.
3 Networks
There aze many ways in which communication between agents in a social environment
(A, r, R) can be established. It is in general not necessary that all communication
relations in (A, R) are activated in order to obtain full communication between all
agents. The question is how communication will be organized between agents. Not
any pattern of agents who communicate with some other agent in (A, R) will be called
a network. In this section we will define feasibility and efficiency criteria for networka
in a social environment (A, r, R).
Definition 3.1 A subset N C A is a network in (A, r, R) iJ it salisJies the two
following requirements:
FLII Scope
It holds that R(N) :- (.J,EN R(a) - A.
Connectivity
For every a,b E N there exists a finite sequence c~, .. ., c„ in N with cl - a,
sThe eoncept "socisl communication" differe from the concept "individual communication" in the
aenae that the Grst concept exprcesce a for evcrybody obscrvablc and commouly known pattern. This
is indicated by the condition offinile acape. 1'he aecond concept expremes a pattern based on private
infotmation, which is not necessarily observable, nor otherwise reatricted.8
c„ - 6, and (c;,c;~l) E R for every i E{1,...,n - 1}.
The definition of a social environment implies that the collection of types A is a network.
The next lemma shows that the collection of networka is indeed quite large.
Lemma 3.2 IJ N C A is a network in (A, r, R), then any set M C A with N C M ís
also a network in (A, r, R).
PROOF
Let N C A and M C A be such that N is a network in (A, r, R) and N C M. Now if
M- N the assertion is evident, thus we may suppose that N~ M.
This immediately implies that R(N) - A C R(M) and thus M satisfies full scope.
By full scope of N it follows that for every type a E M`N there exists a type b E N
with (n, 6) E R. This immediately implies by connectivity of N that M also has to
satisfy connectivity.
The previous discussion makes clear that the notion of a network is too weak to give
a meaningful description of a group of types that is able to handle all communication
within a social environment. Additionally we require that such an organization is
crudely ef6cient in the sense that it is constituted of a minimal mimber of types.
Definition 3.3 A subset N C A is a minimal network in (A, r, R) if ít is a network
in (A, r, R) and additionally ét satisfies
Minimality
There is no type a E N such that N` {a} is a network in (A, r, R).
The next result shows that the efSciency requirement as formulated above is equivalent
to minimality in the sense of set inclusion.
Lemma 3.4 A subset N C A is a minimal network in (A, r,R) if and only if it is a
network in (A, r, R) and there is no pmper subset M~ N, which is also a network in
(A, r, R).9
PROOF
The "if~-part is evident.
To check the "only íf"-part we take N C A as a minimal network and suppose by
contradiction that there is a proper subcollection M~ N that is a network in (A, r, R).
Take a E N`M. By Lemma 3.2 and M C N`{a} we know that N` {a} ia also a
network in (A, r, R). Hence, we have a contradiction with the minimality requirement
of N.
O
The first main result concerns the existence of networks in a limited class of social
relational systems, satisfying compactness of the topological type space. The literature
on general economic equilibrium, e.g., Grodal (1974), Hildenbrand (1974) and Mas-
Colell (1985), shows that this requirement is usually acceptable within the traditional
setting. In our model compactness of the type space, however, has in general to be
evaluated as quite strong an assumption. The reason for this is that the requirement of
the interdependency of the topology and the communication pattern as formulated in
Definition 2.2 (iii) may be the cause of less nicely configured neighbourhood syatems.
Theorem 3.5 is therefore considered as a necessary first step in the proof of the more
general existence result as stated in Theorem 3.6.
Theorem 3.S Ij (A, r, R) is a social envirvnynen! such thal (A, r) is a compact topo-
logical space, then there exists a j' inite minimal network in (A, r, R).
PROOF
Since (A,r) is a compact topological space we know that the covering C-{U, E T ~
a E A and U, C R(a)} of A has a finite subcovering D. Let W be the set given by
W-{aEA~U,ED}.
Furthermore we define
Q:- {N C A ~ N is a finite network in (A, r,R)}.
First we show that Q~ 0. It is clear that W C A is finite and satisfies full scope.
Next define the mapping 0: W x W- ~ 2A, where 0(a, b) - {cl, . .., cK} C A auch that10
cl - a, cK - b, and (ck,cktl) E R for every k E{1,...,K - 1}. This mapping 0 is
well defined by the connectivity assumption as given in Definition 2.4 (ii).
Let ~:- U„ewXw 0(a). Clearly W C~ and thus A- R(W) C R(~). By construction
of 4' it is also evident that it satisfies connectivity. Moreover ~ is a finite set and thua
~ E Q.
We order the collection Q by set theoretic inclusion. Take any totally ordered aub-
collection B of Q. Now it is evident that f1C~ is a lower bound of B with respect to
inclusion, and that flli ~ 0. From finiteness it thus follows that f18 E Q. By appli-
cation of Zorn's lemma there exists a minimal element in the collectíon Q, say Nx.
Obviously N' is finite and satisfies full scope and connectivity. Therefote it has to be
a finite minimal network in (A, r,R).
0
As mentioned before the setting of our framework, in particular requirement 2.2 (iii),
leaves open the problem whether under less strong conditions there exist minimal
networks. In order to formulate a more general existence theorem, we use the finite
scope condition as formulated in Definition 2.4.
R.eordering Lemma. Let (A, r,R) 6e a social environment. There exists an ordering
of the subdivision A-{A„ ~ n E 11111} such that
(i) for every k E loT thegraph (Un-~A,,, Rfl[Un-1A„ xU~-1A„]) is finitely connected
and
(ii) A can be partitioned into a countable collection of sets (B;);EN, where eacb B;
is a finite union of sets in A such that:
B, - {A,},
B~ - {A~,...,A,,,} with n~ ~ 1,
B, -{A,,,-j{1i...,A,,,} with n, ~ n,-~, for r? 2,11
where nr E N for every r E N.
If ~r, - ry~ - 1, then there exist components Ak, E B„ and Ak, E B., auch
that (Ak„ Ak,) E P.
If ~rt - r2~ ~ 1, then for all components Ak, E B„ and Ak, E B„ it óolds that
(Ak~,Ak~) ~ P.
PROOF
The proof of this lemma can eaaily be derived from the fact that A satiafies the finite
scope property. Take an arbitrary A1 E A. Next define Bt :- {At} and B~ :- {A„ E
A`B, ~(A,,, A,) E P}. Moreover, let B,-t, with r? 2, be conatructed, then we choose
( r-i
B, :- S An E A` U Bk (A,~, Am) E P, for some Am E B,-1 .
t k-1
0
With the use of the Reordering Lemma~ we are able to prove an extension of the
existence result as formulated in Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 3.8 Let (A, r, R) 6e a social environment. Let the jollovring properties be
satisfied:
(i) (A,r) is a Hausdorff space.
(ii) For every n E N the component An is a compact subspace of (A, r).
(iii) Derive an ordering and a partition (B;);EN of the condensation (A,P) as de-
scribed in the ReoTdering Lemma. There ezists an Í1~ E N such that for every
j? N there is a unique type á~ E A with A(á~) E B~ such that
R(fii) n A-t(Biti) ~ 0,
where for every A' C A we define A-I(A') :- {a E A ~ A(a) E A'}.
~We remarlc that the reordering ot the class atructure as developed in the Reordering Lemma ie
not unique.12
Then there exists a countaóle minimal network in (A, r,R).
PROOF
Let A be ordered as in the R.eordering Lemma and denote by (Bi)iEN the belonging
partition of the condensation (A, P). Note that from the Reordering Lemma it follows
that for a fixed k E N it holds that for all types a E A-'(Bk) and numbers m E N with
~k - m~ 1 1: R(a) n A-'(B,,,) - 0.
We now take a fixed number k E N.
We, dcfinc the collection, denoted by Sk C 2A, as the class of a11 finite networks H in
the truncated social environment (~J~-1A-~(Bi),r~~f~-1A-'(Bi),Rn [~J~-~ A-'(Bi) x
~J~-~ A-'(Bi)]) such that ák E H. Note that Sk ~ B. This is deduced from the applica-
tion of Theorem 3.5 to the compact social environment (~J~-~ A-' (Bi), r~ ~J~`-1 A-'(Bi), Rn
[~J~`-1A-'(Bi) x ~J~-1A-'(Bi)]). Moreover, it is evident that the collection Sk has a
minimal element. We denote this minimal element by Ek. We remazk that Ek E Sk,
and hence it is a network such that ák E Ek, but that Ek is not necessazily a minimal
network.
From the sequence (Ek)kEN we now construct another sequence, denoted by (E,"E)kEN,
consisting of minimal networks, i.e., for every k E N the collection Ek is a mini-
mal network in the truncated social environment (~J~`-1 A-'(Bi), r~ ~J~-1 A-'(Bi), R n
[U~-i A-1(Bi) x U~-t A-1(Bi)]).
For the construction of the sequence we take a fixed integer k E N, and we note that
we have two possibilities:
1. Ek is a minimal network in
~U A-'(Bi),r U A-'(Bi),Rfl I U A-'(Bi) x U A-1(Bi)J ~-
,-i ;-i l,-i i-i
Then we take Ek - Ek.
2. If F,k is noL a minimal network in
I U A-1(Bi),r U A-i(Bi),Rn ~U A-'(Bi) x U A-1(Bi)J
~~
`~-t i-t t i-t13
then by construction of Ek and property (ii) in the assertion it follows that Ek `
{ák} is a minimal network in (~J~`-~ A-~(Bi), T~ ~Jj-~ A-1(Bi), Rf1IU~-1 A-~(Bi) x
~J~-~ A-1(Bi)]). Hence we take Ek :- Ek `{ák}.
Now Íor every k? N it holds thaL Ek C Ektl.
In fact, since Ektl is a network, it holds by property (iii) of the assertion that ák E Ektl.
But it also holds that Ek `{ák} C Ektl, since there is no direct relation between any
type in Ek `{ák} and any type in Ektl `Ek, i.e., R fl (Ek `{ák} x Ektl ` Ek) - 0.
From these properties it easily follows that Ek C Ektl.
Hence the sequence ( Ek)kEN is increasing with respect to inclusion, and so we can define
the following set:
E' :- Li(Ek) - Ls(Ek)
By the obvions theorems it is easily established that E' is the closed limit of the
sequence (Ek)kEN. (For an elaboration of this remark we refer to Klein-Thompson
(1984) and the introduction in Hildenbrand (1974). There are also given the definitions
of the operators Li and Ls in connection with the topology of closed convergence on a
hyper-space of closed subsets of a certain topological space.)
It is now easily proved that the collection E" is in fact a countable minimal network
in (A, r,R):
Countability




Suppose that this is not true. Then there exists a type a E A such that a~
R(E'). But there also exists a number K? TV, such that a E A-1(~JK1 B~) -
~Jk-~ A-1(B~), and hence a E R(EK) C R(E'). This is a contradiction.
Connectivity
The truncated social environment (E',T~E`, Rfl (E' x E`]) is finitely connected.14
'1'ake any pair of types a, b E E', then there exists a number K? 1~ auch that
a,b E EK. By construction of the sequence (Ek)kEN it holds that a and 6 are
finitely connected within E"x, and hence are finitely connected within E~ for every
j? K? N. Therefore a and b are finitely connected within E'.
Minimality
Suppose there exists a type a E E` such that the collection E' `{a} also satiafiea
full scope and finite connectivity, i.e., it is also a network in (A,r, R).
Now there exists an integer j E l~I such that a E A-r(Bi), with a~ á~ if
j? N. Then it is easy to show that for K :- max{j,N} it holds that Ex
can not be a minimal element in the collection Sk, consisting of networks in
(lJ~-i A-r(~i), r~ U~-r A-'(Bi), Rn IU~-r A-'(Bi) x U~-r A-r(~i)~) containing the
unique element áx E A-r(~x). This is in contradiction with the assumption on
Ex, and hence with the assumptions on E'.
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
4 The core of a large network economy
In this section we consider a specific application of the notion of a network of a social
environment as explored in the previous sections. We limit ourselves to social relational
systems (A, r, R) such that (A, r) is a subspace of the common attribute space P x R~
in the description of exchange economies.
Let P E FI be the number of commodities to be exchanged. Now the nonnegative
orthant of the C-dimensional Euclidean space Qtt describes the space of all posaible
commodity bundles. The space P describes all preference relations on the commodity
space R~, and is endowed with the topology of closed convergence. Grodal (1974) and
Hildenbrand (1974) have shown that P is a compact, separable and metrizable space.
This implies that the product space ~ x it~ is separable and metrizable.
Definition 4.1 A large exchange economy is a triple E- (A, r,p), where15
(i) (A, r) is an uncountable, connected, compact and metrizable subspace of P x
Rt. Let d: A x A-~ R} denote the metric belonging to the topology r on A.
(ii) p: o(r) -~ [0,1] is a normalixed atomless measune on the o-algebm of all Borel
measumble sets of the attribute space (A, r).
In a large exchange economy, an economic agent a E A is represented again by its
type, i.e., the attributed preference relation ~,E P on the commodity space Rt and
the attributed initial endowment w, E R} of commodities. We remazk that the as-
signment of preferences and initial endowments are measurable. We will assume that
the assignment w of initial endowments is integrable and that f w dp ~ 0. Since the
topological space A is connected, there is only one social class in A.
The assumption that (A, r) is connected, i.e., that there is only one clasa in the
economy, is usually not required in the literature on core theory. With this additional
assumption we do not lose any genericity of the analysis below, but it makes the
subsequent analysis mote accessible. We remark that we may derive the same results
if we assume that (A, r) is an at most countable union of connected components.
The communication situation in a large exchange economy is assumed to be
complete. Evidently this situation corresponds to a social environment (A, r, A x A),
i.e., a social environment in which all economic agents aze related with each othet.
This implies that in principle each measurable group of economic agents E E o(r) is
supposed to be formable as a coalition in which the members can exercise economic
exchange activities.
An allocation in a large exchange economy E- (A, r,p) is defined as an inte-
grable function f: A~ R~ such that
f f dte 5 f w d~.
The equilibrium concept to be considered in the setting of a large exchange economy
E is that of the core. This is the collection of allocations, which cannot be improved
upon by any coalition of economic agents.
Definition 4.2 Let E- (A, r, p) 6e a large exchange economy.16
(a) A coalition E E o(r) is able to improve upon an allocation f:A ~ Rf ijthere
exists an integrnble function g: E ~ Rt such that
1 Eg
dp G fEw dp, and
g(a) ~, f(a) for all a E E.
(b) An attocalion j: A~ R~ is a core allocation in E if there is no coalition
E E o(r) that is able to improve upon f.
The core of the large exchange economy E is now the collection of all core allocationa
in E. We denote the core of E by C(E). In a large exchange economy E C(E) ~ 0 if for
all types a E A the preference relation ~,E P is continuous, convex, and monotone.
Next we define an exchange network economy as a large exchange economy endowed
with such a communication constraint R on A that N C A is a minimal network in the
social environment. Let E-(A, r, ~) be a large exchange economy and let R C A x A
be a relation on A such that the triple (A, r, R) is a social environment. Since (A, r) is
a compact metrizable space it immediately follows from Theorem 3.5 that there exists
a finite minimal network in (A, r, R). This justifies the next definition.
Definition 4.3 An exchange network economy is defined as a quintuple E~„ -
(A, r, p, R, N), where E-(A, r, ~) is a large exchange economy, R C A x A is a
relation on A such that (A, r, R) is a social envi~nment, and N C A is a minimal
network in (A, r, R).
An alternative notation for a exchange network economy E~„ is given by the triple
(E, R, N), where the triple E- (A, r,p) is a large exchange economy such that E~„ -
(A, r, p, R, N).
[n the sequel we will limit our analysis to a specific type of exchange network
economy. Let (A, r, le) be a large exchange economy and let E 1 0 be any positive real
number. We define the relation R~ C A x A as for every a, b E A given by (a, 6) E R~
if and only if d(a, b) G e, where d denotes the metric belonging to (A, r).17
Obviously R~ is a properly defined communication pattern. This, together with
the fact that the topological attribute space (A, r) is assumed to be topologically
connected, implies that the conditions of Definition 2.4 are satisfied. Therefore the
triple (A, r, R~) is indeed a social environment. We now denote by Es the network
economy (E, R~, N~). Clearly the network economy Es describes a situation in which
"similar" agents are aggregated in social tribes and are able to communicate with each
other, while "dissimilar" agents are assumed to be unable to communicate. Here the
threshold determining whether agents are similar or dissimilar is given by the test
whether the "distance" between the attributes oí the agents is smaller than E.
The application of a limitation on the communication structure implies that
there are constraints in coalition formation. In this we follow the rule that the consti-
tuting groups of agents forming a coalition are the social tribes as loosely introduced
above. Diflerent tribes within a formable coalition have to be able to communicate
through the (minimal) network N~, and all agents in a neighbourhood in a formable
coalition are able to communicate directly. Thus, a formable coalition consists of a
finite number of tribes, in which there is complete communication, and such that the
finite minimal network N~ can organize all communication between those tribes. More-
over, we will require that the mass or number of agents in a tribe of any formable
coalition is limited by E.
Definition 4.4 A coalition E C A is formable within the network economy Ea ij
there exist sets E1,...,E,y in o(r) and {a1,...,aK} C N~ such that
M
(1) E-Um-1EmU{a1i...,aK}r
(ii) for every 1 C m 5 M: Em E o(r) with p(Em) G E and diam (E,,,) G E, where
the diameter of a set E C A is defined as diam (E) :- sup{d(a, 6) ~ a, b E E};
(iii) for every 1 S m S M and for all b E Em thene exists 1 C k c K with
d(b, ak) G E, and
(iv) {al,...,aK} is a connected subnetwork of N~ in Ra, i.e., for all 1 C k L
K- 1: d(ak,akti) G E.18
An allocation f: A~ Ii} is now a corc allocation in the network economy E. if f cannot
be improved upon by any formable coalition in E~. We denote the collection of all core
allocations in E~ by C(E~). Since we have introduced constraints in coalition formation
it is clear that the collection of all core allocations of the minimal network economy E~
is containing the core of the original large exchange economy E. The reverse inclusion
however also holds as is sliown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5 Let E~ -(E, Rs, N~) . Then
C(E~) - C(E).
PROOF
As we already noted it is evident that C(E) C C(E~). To show the reverse we apply the
main result o[ Grodal (1972). We remark that E indeed satisfies the requirements as
formulated in Grodal (1972). Her theorem now states that if f can be improved upon
by some coalition E' E o(r), then it can also be improved upon by a coalition E-
UmIEm, where E~, ... , EM in v(r) are such that {~(Em) G E as well as diam (Em) G E.
We recall that N~ is a finite subset of A, and thus N~ E v(r) and p(N~) - 0.
By definition of the minimal network N~ in (A, r, R~) for every 1 C m C M and every
b E Em there exists a E N~ such that d(b, a) c E. Thus, for every 1 C m C M there
exists {ai ,..., ak~m)} C N~ such that for every b E Em there is 1 C k 5 k(m) with
d(b, ak) G E. Ucfine
M
Q ; I I m m
- V {al ~ ' ~ ak~m)
m-1
If the collection Q is a connected subnetwork of N~ in R we have shown that E U Q is
a formable coalition in E~, which is able to improve upon f.
If Q is not a connected subnetwork of NE in R, we may add network types ák E N~,
1 5 k C If, such that Q U{ák ~ 1 5 k C K} forms a connected subnetwork of N~ in
R. Clearly E U Q U{ák ~ 1 C k S K} now is a formable coalition in E~, which is able
to improve upon f.
We therefore conclude that C(E~) C C(E) and thus we have shown the assertion.
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